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France is known for the quality and generosity of its health care, which received top ranking from the World Health Organization in 2000.1 
Public health insurance covers the entire population 
and all fees for serious or chronic 
illnesses; patients can choose 
their doctor and hospital; and 
doctors can choose the treatment 
best suited to their patients, in-
cluding highly expensive treat-
ments. The system favors curative 
intervention, as recently illustrated 
by a political decision providing 
funding for free provision of sofos-
buvir to patients with 
hepatitis C. Prevention 
campaigns account for 
only 2.3% of current 
health expenditures. Two sets of 
ethics govern the system: the 
French conception of public ser-
vice, based on equal treatment for 
all, and the ethics of the medical 
profession, which support doctors’ 
independence from public authori-
ties and exclusive devotion to their 
patients’ interests and needs. These 
values have resulted in extensive 
use of health care and therefore 
high expenditures (see table).
Health care absorbs a large 
proportion of the country’s gross 
domestic product relative to that 
in other countries in the Organi-
zation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, but in terms of 
per capita health expenditures, 
France ranks somewhat lower. The 
difference reflects the weakness 
of the economy.2 High unemploy-
ment has caused a chronic deficit 
in the public health insurance 
fund, which relies on work-related 
contributions and taxes. Public 
hospitals have accumulated exten-
sive debt, having made large invest-
ments in improvements requested 
by the government but only partly 
covered by public funding.3 Hospi-
tals were encouraged to take out 
bank loans that they’re now strug-
gling to repay because their reim-
bursement rates have been low-
ered in an effort to limit health 
insurance expenditures. Finding 
a way out of this financial trap 
would require a better-performing 
economy or structural changes in 
the way health care funds are 
raised and distributed — changes 
that no government has dared to 
make. The French public defends 
the system, which they perceive 
as public despite its significant 
private dimensions.
This public–private mix creates 
complexity. Care is provided by 
public hospitals, private not-for-
profit hospitals, and commercial 
hospitals, as well as a large am-
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Variable Value
Health expenditures
Per capita (U.S.$) 4,690
Percentage of GDP 11.7
Out-of-pocket (as % of private health expenditures) 32.1
Public sources (% of total) 76.9
Health insurance
Percentage of population covered 100 (public insurance); 96 (complementary 
insurance)
Source of funding Employers through payroll tax, enrollees 
through a tax on all income that is ear-
marked for the public system
Average physician income (U.S.$ [multiple of average French wage])
Self-employed general practitioner in 2011 79,800 (2.9)
Self-employed specialist in 2011 137,000–159,000 (4.9–5.7)
Salaried physician at public hospitals (mostly specialists) 80,500 (2.9) for doctor; 113,000 (4.0) for 
medical professor




No. of hospital beds per 10,000 population in 2011 64 (34 of which are for acute medical care)
No. of physicians per 1000 population 3.2
Total government health expenditures spent on mental health care in 2011 (%) 12.9
Primary care physicians using electronic medical records (%) 67
Life and death
Life expectancy at birth (yr) 83
Additional life expectancy at 60 yr (yr) 25
Annual no. of deaths per 1000 population 9
No. of infant deaths per 1000 live births (up to 1 yr of age) 3.5
No. of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births† 10.5
Fertility and childbirth
Average no. of births per woman 2
Births attended by skilled health personnel (%) 97
Pregnant women receiving any prenatal care (%) 100
Preventive care
General availability of colorectal-cancer screening at primary care level Yes
Children 12–23 mo of age receiving measles immunization in 2013 (%) 89
Prevalence of chronic diseases (%)
Diabetes in persons 20–79 yr of age in 2013 5.4
HIV infection in persons 15–49 yr of age in 2014 0.4
Prevalence of risk factors (%)
Obesity in adults ≥18 yr of age in 2014 23.9
Overweight or obesity in children ≤5 yr of age in 2013 15.1
Smoking in 2013 28
*  Data are from the World Bank; the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE); la Direction de la recherche, des études, 
de l’évaluation et des statistiques (DREES); the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; the Commonwealth Fund; and the 
World Health Organization and are for 2012, except as noted. GDP denotes gross domestic product, and HIV human immunodeficiency virus.
†  This number includes deaths during pregnancy and for up to 1 year after giving birth that are attributable to causes linked to pregnancy and birth.
Characteristics of the Health Care System and Health Outcomes in France.*
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bulatory care sector composed 
of independent practitioners, of 
whom 53% are general practi-
tioners (GPs) and 47% special-
ists. There are two distinct policy 
domains: the government sets 
payment rates for hospital care, 
whereas independent doctors ne-
gotiate collective agreements with 
the health insurance fund. Health 
insurance does not, however, 
cover the full amount of care ex-
penditures, except in cases such 
as care during pregnancy, for 
specified serious or chronic dis-
eases, and for poor patients who 
are enrolled free of charge. On 
average, insurance covers two 
thirds of expenditures, though 
only a nominal amount for de-
vices such as eyeglasses and 
hearing aids. Most people (96%), 
therefore, also subscribe to a pri-
vate complementary health insur-
ance plan. Insurance is thus a 
two-tiered system, with a statu-
tory portion and a complemen-
tary private one.
France’s institutional patch-
work makes coordinating care 
difficult. Independent practition-
ers, paid on a fee-for-service 
 basis, have little incentive to en-
gage in coordination, data shar-
ing, and the like. They are still 
paid directly by patients, who are 
later reimbursed by insurance. A 
law passed in December 2015 
will require physicians to accept 
third-party payment, but this law 
is opposed by most doctors — 
especially private specialists, many 
of whom are entitled to charge 
more than the official insurance 
rates. Furthermore, independent 
doctors can set up practices 
wherever they want, with no ob-
ligations regarding geographic 
distribution, opening hours, or 
population health. Incomplete re-
imbursement, the requirement for 
up-front payment, and unequal 
distribution of ambulatory care 
are the main barriers to equal 
access. Public hospitals are the 
universal entry point, both for 
poor populations that use emer-
gency services to avoid the finan-
cial constraints of the ambulatory 
care sector and for highly special-
ized consultations, which don’t re-
quire referrals when given in pub-
lic hospitals. Regional hospitals, 
accessible under the same condi-
tions as other public hospitals, 
employ France’s top physicians.
The past 20 years have wit-
nessed many reforms introducing 
approaches adopted elsewhere, 
such as activity-based funding 
for hospitals, best-practice guide-
lines, reductions in the number 
of medical students, introduction 
of flat payment rates, changes in 
reimbursement rates for medi-
cines, and removal of medica-
tions from the list of reimbursed 
treatments. Since doctors pre-
scribe freely, pharmacies have 
been given the right and finan-
cial incentives to replace pre-
scribed brand-name products with 
generics.
Another milestone was the 
introduction of gatekeeping in 
2004. Until then, patients could 
consult as many doctors as they 
wanted, with direct access to 
specialists. Now they must des-
ignate a “referring” physician 
(usually, but not always, a GP). 
Patients can still seek care di-
rectly from other doctors, but 
they’re reimbursed at a lower rate 
if they lack a referral. A limited 
health budget, enacted in 1997, 
finally began to be enforced in 
2010. The rationale behind these 
measures is tighter regulation of 
the care paid for by public insur-
ance and transferring of some 
expenditures to private insurance.
A healthy 23-year-old woman is pregnant for the first time.
When Ms. Bernard discovers she’s pregnant at a young age — 23, when the average age for 
a first birth in France is about 28 — she knows she can choose to have an abortion, which is legal 
and provided free of charge, along with psychological counseling if she wants it. But she decides 
she wants to become a mother and so turns to an independent gynecologist to monitor her preg-
nancy. The gynecologist opens a maternity record and organizes a meeting with a midwife, who 
sets up a support network of various professionals for the pregnancy, delivery, and postnatal 
 period and arranges for educational sessions with other expectant parents. Before her fourth 
month, Ms. Bernard must report her pregnancy to the health care and family branches of the 
 social security institution, so they will provide financial allowances.
Ms. Bernard has monthly appointments and is screened for toxoplasmosis, rubella, diabe-
tes, blood group, and albumin level and undergoes cytobacteriologic tests. Screening for syphi-
lis is compulsory in the first month; for HIV and Down’s syndrome there is systematic but not 
compulsory screening, which Ms. Bernard opts to forgo. Ultrasound scans are performed in the 
third, fifth, and eighth months, and since everything seems fine, Ms. Bernard has no additional 
ultrasound scans. She chooses the hospital where she wants to give birth and must go to that 
institution for her antenatal care in the eighth and ninth months.
Like most women in France, Ms. Bernard has her baby in the hospital under local anesthe-
sia; the vaginal delivery is performed by a midwife, with an obstetrician present. Mother and 
baby remain in the hospital for 3 days.
After they return home, a midwife visits them daily for the first 12 days, and Ms. Bernard 
 attends compulsory medical visits for herself and her daughter 6 weeks later. She also takes 
 advantage of the 10 sessions of postpartum physical therapy to which she’s entitled.
The public health insurance maternity scheme fully covers all medical and paramedical expenses 
from Ms. Bernard’s sixth month of pregnancy onward. It also pays her salary during maternity 
leave (16 weeks) and for 11 working days of leave for her partner. The family allowance fund pro-
vides a “birth bonus” of €923 (about $1,000) for every child born, as well as a child-care allow-
ance. Furthermore, each parent who temporarily stops working receives a monthly allowance of 
€325 to €566 (about $350 to $600) for up to 6 months for the first child and up to 18 months for 
each subsequent child.
Pregnancy and Childbirth
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To secure universal access and 
better coordinate health care re-
sources, cost containment has 
been accompanied by two impor-
tant institutional innovations. 
First, France’s medical safety net 
was reformed in 2000: the medi-
cal assistance program for the 
poor, in which access and bene-
fits varied by location, was abol-
ished and replaced with a unified 
national “Universal Medical Cov-
erage.” 4 This system provides 
free enrollment in both statutory 
health insurance and a comple-
mentary insurance plan for all 
residents with income below a 
certain threshold, who receive 
free care. People with incomes 
up to nearly 30% above the 
threshold receive a voucher to 
help them purchase private com-
plementary insurance. Some 11% 
of the population benefits from 
these schemes.
Though the system was created 
with funding from the govern-
ment and public health insur-
ance, with a small voluntary con-
tribution from complementary 
health insurers, it’s now funded 
entirely by a tax levied on the 
complementary health insurers. 
People’s contributions to private 
insurance thus finance the pub-
lic safety net. Furthermore, be-
ginning in January 2016, all em-
ployers are legally obliged to 
negotiate a collective contract 
with a complementary insurer for 
all their employees.
Complementary insurance has 
become an important policy tool 
for raising new health care fund-
ing, with interesting conse-
quences. First, it’s no longer ob-
vious what percentage of their 
income people contribute to health 
coverage. Second, management 
costs are high for the two-tired 
insurance system, which includes 
some 600 insurers of widely 
varying size.5 Various scenarios 
are currently being explored for 
merging parts of the system or 
unifying the entire system — a 
politically sensitive topic.
The second key innovation was 
regional health agencies (RHAs), 
created in 2009 to adapt national 
policies and regulations to local 
circumstances, restructuring the 
delivery system as necessary. 
RHAs have overarching authority, 
including authority over private 
hospitals and the long-term care 
sector. They allocate the regional 
share of the national health bud-
get to the various care providers 
(except independent doctors). 
Each health care institution must 
negotiate its funding, based on 
“projects,” with the RHA, which 
provides the authorizations nec-
essary to run health services. The 
agencies can thus enforce imple-
mentation of a coherent strategy 
— focused on cost efficiency, 
need satisfaction, and preparing 
for the future — among all care 
providers, including by closing or 
merging services or enforcing 
provider collaboration on, for ex-
ample, creating care pathways, 
improving quality, or implement-
ing e-medicine.
The RHAs are a tool for com-
bining central regulation with 
decentralized contracting. They 
have extensive power and are ac-
countable directly to the govern-
ment. They work closely with 
public hospital directors, who 
often also serve in the Ministry 
of Health and represent a spe-
cialized professional body that is 
key to any effort to redesign 
French health care.
Perhaps French health care’s 
biggest unsolved problem con-
cerns the ambulatory care sector, 
where RHA tools have not been 
effective. As small hospitals have 
been closed down, the rural–
metropolitan imbalance in the 
distribution of doctors has wors-
ened. The RHAs are trying to 
encourage independent health 
professionals to establish multi-
disciplinary health centers in 
shortage areas, but progress re-
A 55-year-old man with no other serious health problems has a moderately severe myocardial infarction.
Mr. Martin’s wife, fearing that her husband is having a heart attack, calls 15, the emergency 
number. The call is answered by a doctor, who hears her description of the symptoms and agrees 
that myocardial infarction is likely; he locates the patient and immediately sends the Service 
 Mobile d’Urgence et de Réanimation (SMUR) — an ambulance or helicopter staffed by an emer-
gency physician, a nurse, and a driver or pilot. The SMUR team confirms the diagnosis and be-
gins treating Mr. Martin with anticoagulants and analgesics, ready to defibrillate if necessary — 
or to administer thrombolytic agents if there is a long delay before they can get him to a cardiology 
center. Fortunately, in this case, they transport their patient in less than 15 minutes to a 24/7 
 interventional cardiac unit, where they find a hospital team already informed and prepared for 
intervention.
Mr. Martin undergoes coronary angioplasty through the radial artery, and two stents are 
placed. He spends 24 hours in the specialized intensive care unit and 4 more days in the hos-
pital, where he is monitored closely for any complications. Long-term aspirin therapy is begun 
while he’s there.
Mr. Martin leaves the hospital with a treatment plan for his GP and cardiologist. Part of the 
plan is cardiac rehabilitation to reduce his cardiovascular risks related to diet, smoking, and ex-
ercise and to facilitate his return to work. His care — including surgery, transport, and rehabili-
tation — is fully covered by public health insurance for 6 months, and afterward according to the 
usual specifications of the health insurance program. All patients are treated the same way, in-
cluding nonresidents. No payment is required at the emergency stage; any administrative or 
monetary matters are considered later.
Myocardial Infarction
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mains slow. In fact, France faces 
a general medical demography 
problem: the average age of doc-
tors is 51.4 years, and two thirds 
of medical students are now 
women. It seems unlikely that 
this new generation of mostly fe-
male doctors will choose to work 
as independent GPs in rural areas 
where social opportunities, espe-
cially in terms of employment for 
their partners, are rather limited. 
Current measures for enhancing 
the workforce include accepting 
more students into medical schools 
and investing in new technology 
and innovation to keep the best 
doctors in the public hospitals.
Responding to high public ex-
pectations remains challenging for 
regulators and policymakers. The 
lessons from the French health 
care experience are that accessible, 
high-quality care requires high 
levels of public expenditure, which 
require the support of the public 
and influential professions, and 
that the existence of nationwide 
complementary private health in-
surance allows not only for shift-
ing expenditures toward private 
pockets, but also for raising 
“complementary” funds that can 
help finance free care for serious 
illness and for a public safety net.
Disclosure forms provided by the author 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
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Physicians and Youth Tackle Football
Tolerable Risks? Physicians and Youth Tackle Football
Kathleen E. Bachynski, M.P.H. 
A t least 11 U.S. high-school athletes died playing foot-
ball during the fall 2015 season. 
Their deaths attracted widespread 
media attention and provided 
fodder for ongoing debates over 
the safety of youth tackle foot-
ball. In October 2015, the Ameri-
can Academy of Pediatrics (AAP) 
issued its first policy statement 
directly addressing tackling in 
football. The organization’s Coun-
cil on Sports Medicine and Fit-
ness conducted a review of the 
literature on tackling and foot-
ball-related injuries and evaluat-
ed the potential effects of limit-
ing or delaying tackling on injury 
risk. It found that concussions 
and catastrophic injuries are par-
ticularly associated with tack-
ling and that eliminating tackling 
from football would probably re-
duce the incidence of concus-
sions, severe injuries, catastrophic 
injuries, and overall injuries.1
But rather than recommend 
that tackling be eliminated in 
youth football, the AAP commit-
tee primarily proposed enhancing 
adult supervision of the sport. It 
recommended that officials en-
force the rules of the game, that 
coaches teach young players 
proper tackling techniques, that 
physical therapists and other 
specialists help players strength-
en their neck muscles to prevent 
concussions, and that games and 
practices be supervised by certi-
fied athletic trainers. There is no 
systematic evidence that tackling 
techniques believed to be safer, 
such as the “heads-up” approach 
promoted by USA Football (ama-
teur football’s national governing 
body), reduce the incidence of con-
cussions in young athletes. Con-
sequently, the AAP statement ac-
knowledged the need for further 
study of these approaches. The 
policy statement also encouraged 
the expansion of nontackling 
leagues as another option for 
young players.
The AAP committee shied 
away from endorsing the elimi-
nation of tackling in youth foot-
ball, because doing so would 
fundamentally change the way 
the game is played. Yet evidence 
indicates that tackle football in 
its current form is inconsistent 
with the AAP mission “to attain 
optimal physical, mental, and 
social health and well-being for 
all infants, children, adolescents 
and young adults.” Repetitive 
brain trauma can have serious 
short- and long-term conse-
quences, including cognitive and 
attention deficits, headaches, 
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